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Abstract 
We argue that cross-licensing is a device to establish specialization in a multi-product Stackelberg duopoly under 
process innovation. The optimum licensing contracts are royalty contracts. These are designed so as to implement the 
joint-profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The 
monopoly-First-Best optimum is attained: each firm produces solely the good for which it has a technological 
advantage, firms' joint profits attain the First Best optimum. We study the implications of limitations to contract 
enforceability and find that this may reduce the attained degree of specialization, but social welfare may increase. 
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     Introduction
Patent licensing is a main channel through which dissemination of innovations
takes place.
The literature on licensing has identified several incentives to license process
innovation or products to competitors or to others. Licensing may increase profits
through the replacement of inefficient production techniques, by increasing
demand, by facilitating collusion, by eliminating R&D expenditures or by deterring
entry of stronger competitors.
Antitrust law historically has viewed certain types of licensing contracts,
cross-licensing or pooling agreements, with suspicion because these mechanisms
are potentially capable of promoting collusion in the product market (Gallini, 2002;
Gilbert, 2004).
Cross-licensing is simply an agreement between two companies that grant each
the right to practise the other’s patents. Through cross-licensing each firm is
enabled to innovate more quickly and more effectively without fear that the other
will hold up by asserting a patent that it has unintentionally infringed.
In a patent pool, an entire group of patents is licensed in a package, either by
one of the patent holders or by a new entity established for this purpose, usually
anyone willing to pay the associated royalties.
Empirical evidence shows that innovations in hardware, software or
biotechnology often build on a number of innovations developed and patented by a
set of different producers. In many cases there are multiple pathways to be
investigated, for instance in bio-medical research. Cross-licensing agreements and
patent pools are therefore an economic necessity.
The literature on cross-licensing has stressed that it facilitates collusion. Firms
can achieve a collusive outcome by adopting proper punishment schemes. In fact
Shapiro (1985 p.26) states that: ”two rivals (with or without innovations) alternately
could design a cross-licensing agreement whereby each would pay the other a
royalty per unit of output, ostensibly for the right to use the other’s technology. By
imposing a “tax” on each other (or by writing pricing or territorial restrictions into the
cross-licensing contract), the firms could again achieve the fully collusive outcome.
A cross-licensing contract may be required to achieve the fully collusive outcome if
the firms produce different products or are otherwise heterogeneous”.
Eswaran (1994) assumes that the firms license their technologies to each other
but tacitly agree not to produce from the acquired technology as long as the
contracting firm does not defect. In an infinitely repeated game it is shown that
collusion can be sustained from tacitly restricted level of production by credibly
introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm’s product. Lin
(1996) is close to Eswaran’s contribution as fixed fee licensing makes firms’ costssymmetric and increases the licensee’s scope for retaliation.
Fershtman and Kamien (1992) deals with cross licensing of complementary
technologies, that may be independently developed by different firms. Relevant to
this note is the problem the firms face about how to design a cross licensing
agreement such that the resultant non-cooperative game, yields equilibrium profits
identical to the cooperative outcome.
K.Kultti et al. (2006) shows that cross-licensing is a device to establish
multi-market contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) and is likely to raise anti-trust
concerns only in so far multi-market contact does and that cross-licensing is
irrelevant for sustaining tacit collusion.
This note studies product specialization in a duopoly where each firm produces
two imperfect-substitute goods. In the case of Stackelberg competition, we show
that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained under
optimal cross-licensing arrangements. The optimum licensing contracts are
royalty-contracts. Royalties are set so as to implement the joint-profit maximization
(monopoly) outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The
monopoly-First-Best optimum is attained: i) each firm produces solely the good for
which it has a technological advantage; ii) the quantities of goods which are
produced are the monopoly levels; iii) firms’ joint profits attain the First Best
optimum.
In case of limitations to contract enforceability, it is not convenient for firm i to
specialize in good i and both firms produce both goods. Therefore the licensing
contract is not a Nash equilibrium and renegotiation proof.
These results compliments the Cournot case discussed in Filippini (2006) in
three extensions: checking out the robustness of the findings in the Stackelberg
framework that fits better the assumption of process innovation in one good, the
good where each firm is a leader; firms behave cooperatively to maximize their joint
profits along the lines of the widely used taxonomies of R&D cooperation (Kamien
et al., 1992), and finally contract enforceability is not assumed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework in
Stackelberg competition, where the two firms diversify their production and
considers the introduction of the process innovation that may lead to product
specialization. Section 3 discusses the cross-licensing case and the product
specialization which results from that. Section 4 analyzes the case where contract
enforceability is not assumed.
Two Stackelberg firms diversifying their production
Let’s consider an industry composed by two symmetric firms, and two imperfect
substitute goods, good 1, good 2. Each firm can produce both goods, and qij is the
quantity of good i produced by firm j.
Demands are derived from the maximization problem of a representative
consumer (as shown by Singh and Vives, 1984), endowed with a utility function
separable and linear in the numeraire good, m, given by:uq1,q2  aq1  q2 − q1
2/2 − q2
2/2 − q1q2  m,
where: q1  q11  q12; q2  q21  q22, and  an element of 0,1 represents the
degree of product differentiation.
Therefore inverse demand functions are linear:
p1  a − q11  q12 − q21  q22
p2  a − q11  q12 − q21  q22,
     1
where pi is the price of good i,i  1,2.
Firm cost functions are linear and symmetric: each firm produces both good i,
and suppose that Firm 1 discovers and patents a cost reducing technology,
respectively, for good 1, and Firm 2 for good 2, that lead to zero cost in production.
The other is produced at the constant marginal cost, c. We assume c  a in order
to avoid a corner solution.
The profits functions are (the subscript P denotes process innovation):
1P  p1q11  p2q21 − cq21
2P  p1q12  p2q22 − cq12.
     2
Let consider Stackelberg quantity competition (Boyer and Moreaux, 1987),
under the demand and cost assumptions above-mentioned. Firms 1 and 2 are,
respectively, leader for good 1 and 2 and choose their (individual) profit-maximizing
outputs. Specifically, firm 1:
q11
Max q11p1  b2q21p2 − c
s.t.
firm 2’s best response for good 1, b2 ;
q11 ≥ 0,q21 ≥ 0,
     3.a
firm 2:
q22
Max b1q12p1 − c  q22p2
s.t.
firm 1’s best response for good 2, b1,
q12 ≥ 0,q22 ≥ 0.
     3.b
.
As profit functions are concave in output, FOC are necessary and sufficient for a
maximum.Solving system 3.a − 3.b leads to:
1)
if c  d′ ≡ a1 − 2 − 2 − 2
6  4 − 3
, and   3 − 1      4
then there is limited specialization:
Equilibrium outputs are strictly positive, and are given by:
q11  q22 
a1−422c46−2
1−182
q12  q21 
a1−2−2−2c64−3
1−182
     4.a
Prices and profits (the subscript LS denotes limited specialization and
Stackelberg quantities) are:
pi  a  c2  2
8  2







     4.c
2) if:
c ≥ d′  a1 − 2 − 2 − 2
6  4 − 3
     5
then there is full specialization:
Equilibrium outputs, prices and profits (the subscript FM denotes full











iFM   a
2 2
     6This leads to:
Proposition : The Nash - Stackelberg equilibrium entails:
i) full specialization in case of drastic innovation, i.e. condition 5 holds.
ii) limited specialization in case of non-drastic innovation, i.e. condition 4
holds.
Clearly, in the case of non-drastic innovation, firms would be better off if they
could commit to joint profit maximization.
However, the only credible commitments are those that are incentive
compatible, and q12
∗  q21
∗  0, are not. Indeed, the unique Nash-Stackelberg
equilibrium has qij›0 (by ii) of Proposition 1).
We show below that there exists a cross-licensing scheme that implements the
collusive outcome: the unique Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium entails full
specialization, and firm profits attain the First Best optimum level.
Cross licensing in a Stackelberg framework
In the cross-licensing game, at the first stage (i.e. the licensing stage), firms act
cooperatively: firms 1 and 2 choose ri,Fi that maximize joints profits. In the
second stage, firms again engage in quantity Stackelberg competition.




















     7At the first stage, each firm i chooses ri,Fi in order to maximize joint profits
subject to output non-negativity constraints. That is:
ri,Fi
Max 1SLicr1,r2  2SLicr1,r2
s.t.
q11 ≥ 0,q21 ≥ 0,q12 ≥ 0,q22 ≥ 0,
ri,Fi ≥ 0
     8
In the unique Nash equilibrium, licensing contracts are pure royalty contracts:
ri  a
2      9
Proposition : The optimum licensing contracts are the royalty-contracts
defined by 9. These implement the monopoly-First-Best optimum in the
Stackelberg case.
We now compare social welfare between cross-licensing and the process
innovation status quo. The social welfare functions are:








∗ is by 6 :
WLic  a23  /2  2.
We have:
Proposition : Social welfare in the cross-licensing case is always lower than
with no–licensing, for all  and c ∈ 0,c  d′.
Proof:
First note that WLS attains its minimum value when the cost, c, equals cmin 
2a1−21022
926882−43−4−5 ,where WLic  WLScmin.
Further note that WLic  WLSc  0 and lim WLSc → d′WLic.
This result is in contrast with that attained in the Cournot framework (Filippini,
2006). The economic intuition for Proposition 3 is in that cross-licensing implements
monopoly output, and therefore induces an output decrease with respect to
Stackelberg competition. However, it also gives rise to efficiency gains, becauseproduction is obtained with the most efficient technology. Social welfare improves
when the efficiency gain overcomes the output loss, and viceversa.
Stackelberg Cross-Licensing: limitations to contract
enforceability
Contract offers are made by one firm, the other either rejects the offer or
accepts it. If the latter rejects it then it will necessarily use the old technology, if it
accepts it then royalty-payment obligations are due independently of the
technology used and therefore its profit-maximizing choice is necessarily to adopt
the new (cost-reducing) technology.
This section derives the implications that would result from limitations to
contract enforceability, and specifically from the possibility that the Firm i, after
having signed the contract, reneges on its royalty-contractual obligations on the
grounds that it does not use the new technology. Therefore in equilibrium Firm i
produces both goods. This possibility implies that Firm i fulfills its contractual
obligations if and only if it finds it optimal to specialize. Figure 1 shows all
combinations of firms’ profits when each firm produces either one good or two
goods.
Firm 2 produces Firm 2 produces







Figure 1 - Profits for Firm 1 and 2
The focus of this section is to derive sufficient condition so that both Firms are
monopolists of a substitute good.
The game played by the two firms is a non-cooperative two-stage game.
At the first stage, each firm i chooses ri,Fi in order to maximize joints profits
subject to its own and its rival’s individual-rationality constraints, and to output
non-negativity constraints. In the second stage firms engage in Stackelberg
competition as described in Section 2.
This adds to the licensor’s optimization problem the constraint that the profits of
Firm i in the licensing case, iSLicr1,r2,.., must exceed the profits of Firm i that
reneges its obligations and still produces goods j≠ i at cost c, iSLicri,c,...
That is:ri,Fi




q11 ≥ 0,q21 ≥ 0,q12 ≥ 0,q22 ≥ 0,ri,Fi ≥ 0
     10
In the unique Nash equilibrium, licensing contracts are:
ri  c,F  0.      11
The optimal licensing contract is a royalty and it exceeds the cost reduction (see
also Filippini, 2005). Equilibrium outputs increase and social welfare may too.
This leads to:
Proposition : If contract enforceability is not assumed, in cross licensing it is
not convenient for firm i to specialize in good i and both firms produce both goods.
Therefore the licensing contract is not a Nash equilibrium and renegotiation proof.
But social welfare may increase.
From the antitrust perspective the implications of Propositions 3 and 4 are clear.
Antitrust laws discourage collusion not for its own sake but because collusion
harms consumers. The above Propositions shows that cross licensing may
increase welfare.
Conclusion
We have studied product specialization in a Stackelberg framework where each
firm produces two imperfect-substitute goods. We have shown that under process
innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained under cross-licensing
arrangements. The optimum licensing contracts are royalty contracts. These are
designed so as to implement the joint-profit maximization (monopoly) outcome as
the unique Nash equilibrium of the competition game. The monopoly-First-Best
optimum is attained: Each firm produces solely the good for which it has a
technological advantage, firms’ joint profits attain the First Best optimum.
In case of limitations to contract enforceability, in cross licensing it is not
convenient for firm i to specialize in good i and both firms produce both goods.
Therefore the licensing contract is not a Nash equilibrium and renegotiation proof.
But social welfare may increase.
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